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Abstract: 
How do we understand national climate change politics in the United States?  Using a 
methodological innovation in network analysis, this paper analyzes discussions about the issue 
within the US Congress.  Through this analysis, the ideological relationships among speakers 
providing Congressional testimony on the issue of climate change are mapped. For the first time, 
issue stances of actors are systematically aggregated in order to measure coalitions and 
consensus among political actors in American climate politics in a relational way. Our findings 
show how consensus formed around the economic implications of regulating greenhouse gases 
and the policy instrument that should do the regulating.  The paper is separated into three 
sections.  First, we review the ways scholars have looked at climate change policymaking in the 
United States, paying particular attention to those who have looked at the issue within the US 
Congress. Next, we present analysis of statements made during Congressional hearings on 
climate change over a four year period. Our analysis demonstrates how a polarized ideological 
actor space in the 109th Congress transforms into a more consensual actor landscape in the 110th 
Congress, which is significantly less guided by partisan differences.  This paper concludes by 
discussing how these findings help us understand shifting positions within American climate 
politics and the implications of these findings. 
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Introduction 
How do we understand the lack of a national climate policy in the United States?  Under both 
Democratic and Republican Party leadership, the US has been unsuccessful in passing legislation 
that regulates the emission of greenhouse gases. Since the Kyoto Protocol entered into legal 
force on 16 February 2005, a number of bills have been proposed in the US Congress that would 
establish a federal climate change policy, but none have successfully been passed through both 
houses of the Congress and entered into law.1 
Social scientists have attempted to understand this lack of a federal climate change policy 
in many ways, focusing on various aspects of the issue (e.g. Christiansen, 2003; Fisher, 2004; 
Fletcher, 2009;  Harris, 2000; Hovi and Skodvin, 2008; Jacques et al., 2008; Lisowski, 2002; 
Lutzenhiser, 2001; McCright and Dunlap, 2000; 2003; Rabe, 2004; 2010; Rudel, 2001; Selin and 
VanDeveer, 2007; Victor, 2004; see also Gelbspan, 1997; Leggett, 1999; Ward, et al., 2008 for 
more popular accounts).  On the one hand, there have been numerous studies that focus on 
climate change politics in the US to understand how national politics contribute to the American 
position in international negotiations and within the global climate change regime (for recent 
accounts, see particularly Bang et al., 2007; Paterson, 2009; Skodvin and Andresen, 2009).  On 
the other hand, a growing number of scholars have looked at the policy-making process 
specifically within the United States.  Much of this research has assessed the relationship 
between sub-national and national policymaking around the issue (see e.g. Fisher, forthcoming; 
Jones, 1991; Rabe, 2007, 2009; Selin and VanDeveer, 2009; Vasi, 2006). 
Although the studies are numerous, very little research to date has analyzed the role that 
specific actors play within the US Congress (but see McCright and Dunlap, 2003; Fisher, 2006; 
Liu et al. 2011).  This paper builds on this limited work to analyze how the actors involved in 
discussions about climate politics in the US are ideologically related, and how these interactions 
help explain climate politics in the United States over time. 
 This paper is separated into three sections.  First, we review the ways that scholars have 
explained American climate politics, paying particular attention to those who study climate 
change policymaking in the US Congress. Next, we present analysis of Congressional hearings 
on climate change over a four year period that employs an innovation in network analysis.  This 
paper concludes by discussing how these findings help us understand American climate politics 
and how they have changed over time, as well as the role that different interests play. 
 
Understanding Climate Change Policymaking in the United States 
As has been previously stated, there has been a good deal of research on the politics of climate 
change in the United States in recent years (e.g. Arimura et al., 2007; Fisher, 2004; Harris, 2000; 
Jacques et al., 2008; Lisowski, 2002; Lutzenhiser, 2001; McCright and Dunlap, 2000; 2003; 
Rabe, 2004; 2010; Selin and VanDeveer, 2007; Skodvin and Andresen, 2009; Victor, 2004).  
Much of this research focuses on explaining the US position in international climate change 
policymaking.  In his attempt to explain the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, for 
example, Lisowski applies Putnam’s logic of the two-level game between international and 
national politics (Putnam, 1988; see also Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam, 1993). Lisowski finds 
that US President George W. Bush took advantage of politics inside the United States to 
“legitimize his hawkish approach” internationally (2002:101). Although Lisowski suggests that 
President Bush worked within the US political system to further his perspective, more recent 
                                                 
1 For a summary of and comparison among the bills, see 
www.eenews.net/special_reports/climate_change_domestic/comparison_chart/ (accessed 28 September 2011). 
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work suggests that the legislature continues to play a very big role in US climate politics.  In his 
paper on US climate politics after the election of  President Obama in 2008, for example, 
Paterson makes a compelling case to show why “effects of a new US President on global climate 
politics will be rather less than might be expected” (2009: 140).   
Other studies are more specifically focused on climate change politics inside the country.  
Lutzenhiser, for example, aims to explain the U.S. position on climate change. Analyzing the 
different proposals for potential climate change policy in the United States, the author finds that, 
as of summer 2001, there was “no U.S. climate policy and little debate about one” (2001:512; 
but see Arimura et al., 2007). The author specifically focuses on political and economic factors 
to explain what he calls “non-policy” in the United States (see also Christiansen, 2003 for a more 
recent account).  There have been a limited number of studies that look at federalism and climate 
change policies in the United States to understand this “non-policy.”  These studies build on the 
general notion that subnational efforts have emerged to “fill a policy void left by federal inaction 
or refusal to act” (Krane 2007: 462; see also Jones, 1991; Kramer and Schreurs, 2007; Rabe, 
2009; Selin and VanDeveer, 2009).  Analyzing legislative efforts in 2008-9 to pass a climate bill 
through both houses of the US Congress, Rabe finds “American climate change policy to date 
suggests considerable aversion to any strategy that would impose significant costs on citizens 
through energy taxation or equivalents” (2010: 605-6).  
At the same time, there have been a number of studies that explain US climate politics by 
focusing instead on the role that different social actors play in political decisionmaking, with 
many of them focusing particularly on the role of conservative think tanks in climate change 
policymaking to understand the lack of a national climate change policy in the United States.  
Jacques, Dunlap and Freeman, for example, find that the conservative movement successfully 
challenged the science of climate change through publications that are linked to conservative 
think tanks (2008; see also McCright and Dunlap, 2000; 2003; see also Hoffman, 2011; 
Norgaard, 2011). In an earlier investigation, McCright and Dunlap conclude that “the 
conservative movement and especially the conservative think tanks appear to have successfully 
affected our nation’s policymaking, this time with international implications” (2003:370; see also 
2000).   
 
Studying the US Congress 
Although the overall theme of the research on climate change politics in the United States has 
focused on national policymaking, looking at the challenges within the US, as well as how the 
politics inside the country contribute to the country’s position in international negotiations about 
the issue, there is a small number of studies that explore these politics within the legislative 
branch of the government (e.g. Fisher, 2006; Liu et al., 2011; McCright and Dunlap, 2003; Park 
et al., 2010).   Fisher, for example, looks at the role that different interests play in the voting 
behavior of Senators (2006).  She concludes: “how society uses natural resources such as coal 
contributes to the influence that such natural resource interests can wield in the policy-making 
process” (2006: 488; see also Skodvin and Andresen 2009).  
Congressional hearings are an important part of the policymaking process in the United 
States.  In the words of the Governmental Printing Office, they are the principal way that 
Congress members “obtain information and opinions on proposed legislation, conduct an 
investigation, or evaluate/oversee the activities of a government department or the 
implementation of a Federal law.”2  The importance of such hearings as a source of information 
                                                 
2 http://www.gpo.gov/help/about_congressional_hearings.htm (accessed 28 September 2011). 
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has been noted within the academic literature as well (see particularly Arnold 1990; Baumgartner 
and Jones, 1993; Burstein and Hirsh, 2007; Clifton, 2004; Gormley, 1998; Liu et al. 2011).  
Testimonies at hearings are given by a range of policy actors, including governmental agency 
officials, interest groups, businesses, think tanks, academic researchers, as well as members of 
the US Congress (for a discussion, see Burstein and Hirsh, 2007; DeGregorio, 1998).  
Congressional hearings provide a forum for different policy actors to get their perspectives 
recognized and garner the attention and support of different political contingencies.  These 
testimonies inform decisionmakers about topics ranging from science, technology, economics 
and policy.  In the words of Burstein and Hirsh, “Members of Congress believe that hearings 
provide an efficient way to gather information and exert influence….Interest organizations, too, 
see hearings as important venues for conveying information” (2007: 179; see also Laumann and 
Knoke 1987).   
Specifically building off of the research on agenda-grabbing and agenda setting in 
political science (for a summary of these theories, see Kingdon, 1995; Baumgartner and Jones, 
1993; Jones and Baumgartner, 2005), Liu and his colleagues incorporate data on Congressional 
Hearings in their efforts to understand media and Congressional attention to climate change 
(2011).  Within the study, the authors analyze the annual number of Congressional hearings on 
climate change as a measure of Congressional attention to the issue, finding that the change in 
number of Congressional hearings on climate change was associated with international events, 
climate conditions, and what they call “climate science feedback”  (2011: 415).  In other words, 
the authors find that, along with other factors, the more climate change-related articles were 
published in scientific journals the previous year, the more attention the issue received in the 
mainstream media and the Congress.  Similarly, in his book on the political economy of 
expertise, Esterling compares the politics of sulfur emissions trading to school choice and HMO 
promotion to understand the use of expert policy ideas in politics (2004). The author concludes 
that there are different patterns of debate within Congressional hearings that can be explained by 
“predictions appropriate to the state of knowledge for each policy and each case” (2004: 234).   
Coming from a different perspective, Park and colleagues use Congressional hearings on 
climate change to investigate the ways that various issues are framed in political debates (2010).  
The authors find that hearings on climate change are much more likely to occur in Democrat-
controlled Congressional sessions, and that Democratic Congresses tend to feature testimony 
from more pro-environment political actors and mainstream scientists (2010: 12).  When the 
Republicans hold the majority in Congress, in contrast, testimony about the issue primarily 
comes from speakers in the business and industrial sectors.  Moreover, the content of the 
testimonies are more likely to challenge the science of climate change and discuss potential 
negative impacts of climate change policy on economic growth and foreign relations (Park et al., 
2010: 12-13; see also McCright and Dunlap, 2003).   
Although the studies of Congressional Hearings on climate change are quite limited, 
there are a small number of scholars who have specifically looked at who speaks in 
Congressional hearings to understand the policy-making process (e.g. DeGregorio, 1998; 
Burstein and Hirsch, 2007).  In their work studying policy innovation in the US Congress, 
Burstein and Hirsch analyze the Congressional testimonies of a random sample of policy 
proposals to understand their outcome (2007).  Looking at the interest groups that contribute to 
policy discussions through Congressional hearings, the authors conclude that “Information—
particularly information regarding policy effectiveness—does affect the likelihood that a policy 
proposal will be enacted” (2007: 174). In other words, if policy makers are knowledgeable about 
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the likely success (or failure) of a policy instrument, they are also more likely to adopt (reject) 
this instrument. Analyzing individual preferences and “policy beliefs” (Sabatier and Weible 
2007) is key to understanding what courses of action are taken by a collective decisionmaking 
body like the US Congress. 
Although this research takes an important first step in understanding Congressional 
Hearings, very little of it specifically focuses on climate change policymaking within the US 
Congress.  Moreover, it has yet to analyze explicitly the relationship between the content of the 
discussions within the Congress and variation in the collective policy outcome. This paper, 
accordingly, applies an innovation in social network analysis to map the ideological networks of 
American climate politics within the US Congress.   
In order to measure policy beliefs of decision makers, several kinds of data sources are 
available. This study analyzes text data from testimonies in the US Congress rather than full-text 
archives of news media, which has been explored in other contexts (see e.g. Hoffman 2011). 
Although secondary sources like the news media can help to uncover some of the central topics 
around climate policy, data on Congressional testimonies provide direct accounts of the 
discourse and debate around climate legislation, as well as the issue more broadly.  As a result, 
the perspectives presented during Congressional hearings are an ideal data source for 
understanding the political alliances around the main issues being debated. The structure of these 
alliances constrains or promotes active policy-making related to climatic change. It is, hence, 
crucial to know the character and shape of these alliances and how they change over time. 
Measuring this causal antecedent is a necessary step for understanding temporal variation in the 
design of climate change legislation or its absence.  In the pages that follow, we discuss how our 
data were collected and analyzed, and then present our findings to show how the perspectives 
presented therein are ideologically related.   
 
Data and Methods 
In this dataset, the testimonies from climate change hearings during the 109th and 110thsessions 
of the US Congress were analyzed.  The 109th (January 3, 2005-January 3, 2007) and 110th 
Congresses (January 3, 2007-January 3, 2009) were during the second term of George W. Bush’s 
Presidency. During this time period, 341 pieces of legislation, such as bills, resolutions and 
amendments, pertaining to issues about climate change or global warming were introduced (106 
in the 109thCongress3 and 235 in the 110th Congress4).  There was a Republican majority in both 
bodies of the US Congress during the 109th Congress: Republicans held 55% of the voting share 
in Senate and they held 53% of the voting share in the House of Representatives.5  In the 110th 
Congress, however, Democrats controlled the majority of the House of Representatives with 
54.3% of the voting share.  During this Congressional session, Democrats held 49 seats in the 
Senate.  However, the two Independent members of the Senate both caucused with the 
Democrats, which resulted in their holding 51% of the voting share during this session.6 
                                                 
3 http://www.pewclimate.org/federal/congress/109 (accessed 28 September 2011). 
 
4 http://www.pewclimate.org/federal/congress/110 (accessed 29 September 2011). 
 
5 During the 109th Session of the US Congress, there was one independent member of the Senate and one 
independent member of the House of Representatives.  
 
6 For more detail, see www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RS22555.pdf (accessed 28 September 2011). 
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A search for all hearings that discussed climate change was conducted through the 
Government Printing Office (GPO), which archives transcripts from Congressional hearings and 
makes them available for the public record.7  Using the search terms “global warming” and 
“climate change,” we identified all of the hearings that discussed these issues during the 109th 
and 110th Sessions of the US Congress (2005-2008). Although our primary resource for 
obtaining transcripts of testimonies is the GPO, the results of these searches were cross-
referenced with two other sources to ensure accuracy:  THOMAS,8 the website and search 
engine for the Library of Congress; and the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, a non-profit 
that monitors climate change discussions and legislation in the US Congress.9  The results of the 
searches from these three sources were compared to ensure that all of the hearings about climate 
change were accounted for and included in the dataset.  
In addition to comparing these findings, the contents of each hearing were reviewed to 
confirm that the focus of each hearing was actually the topic of climate change.  After this 
review, eight hearings in the 109th and three hearings in the 110th Session of Congress were 
excluded from the analyses.  For example, Senate Hearing 109-448, the “U.S. foreign policy, 
petroleum, and the Middle East : hearing before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,” came up in our 
search.  Upon review of the content of the hearing, it was determined that climate change was 
not the main focus of the hearing.  As a result, this hearing was removed from our analysis.  In 
the end, our searches yielded 71 relevant hearings between 2005 and 2008.  The transcripts of 29 
hearings in the 109th Congress were analyzed, which included a total of 498 testimonies and 
statements.  From the 110th Congress, there were 42 relevant hearings and 598 total testimonies 
and statements by members of the Congress. Only formal statements were included in the 
analysis.  Comments made during the question-and-answer portion of the hearings were not 
analyzed. 
 The testimonies from these Congressional hearings comprised the dataset and the 
transcribed texts of each testimony were then transferred into the Discourse Network Analyzer 
program, which was used for data management, coding and conversion into network data 
(Leifeld, 2010; cf. Leifeld and Haunss).  Discourse Network Analyzer (DNA) is a new computer 
program that allows for the qualitative coding of articles and statements and prepares the data for 
network analysis and visualizations so that the ideological relationship between the actors on 
each policy issue can be mapped and the strength of these ties can be quantified. Unlike other 
software packages for qualitative data analysis, DNA was designed to encode the policy beliefs 
and preferences of political actors appearing somewhere in the text (rather than merely encoding 
variables related to a whole text document). Once the “statements” of political actors have been 
tagged in a body of testimonies, these structured data can be converted into networks of speakers 
and their interconnection by commonly held policy beliefs or preferences. 
The testimonies were organized by hearing number and speaker.  In the cases where 
testimonies were submitted on behalf of an organization, but without a speaker actually testifying 
in person, the organization name was used. These speakers and organizations were then 
                                                 
7 For details, see http://www.gpoaccess.gov/crecord/ (accessed 28 September 2011). 
 
8 For details, see http://thomas.loc.gov/ (accessed 28 September 2011). 
 
9 In November 2011, the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions became the successor of the Pew Center 
on Global Climate Change.  For details, see http://www.c2es.org/federal/archives (accessed 23 April 2012). 
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classified into seven types: (1) Businesses and Business Associations/Trade Groups, (2) 
Democratic members of the US Congress, (3) Environmental Groups, (4) Republican members 
of the US Congress, (5) Scientists, (6) US Executive Branch (which includes representatives 
from Government Agencies), and (7) Other, which includes the small number of Independent 
members of the US Congress. 
 The statements were coded for eight categories that are particularly relevant to 
discussions about climate change policy in the United States.  Coding involved noting whether 
the speaker agreed or disagreed with the specific statement.  Two of the categories were about 
the science of climate change, which has been a central theme in the climate change debate in the 
United States: “climate change is real and anthropogenic” and “climate change is caused by 
greenhouse gases.”  The six other categories were about different climate policy issues: “there 
should be legislation to regulate the emission of pollutants,” “legislation should regulate carbon 
dioxide emissions,” “legislation that regulates carbon dioxide emissions will not hurt the 
economy,”  “the United States should regulate carbon dioxide regardless of what developing 
countries do,” “legislation should establish a market for carbon emissions (cap and trade),” and 
“there should be a carbon tax.” Whenever a statement falling under one of the eight categories 
was made, the statement was coded.  Sometimes specific testimonies included multiple 
statements that were coded in the same category.  In some cases, statements included mention of 
both sides of the issue, suggesting that the speaker holds a moderate stance on the issue.  For 
example, Peter Orszag, the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, gave a testimony on 1 
November 2007 before the Committee on the Budget of the U.S. House of Representatives that 
presented both sides of the issue regarding the economic implications of regulating carbon 
dioxide emissions.  In one part of the testimony he states that the regulation of carbon dioxide 
emissions “would produce long-term economic benefits by avoiding some future climate-related 
damage.”  In another portion of the testimony, he notes “there would, however, be costs as the 
economy adapted to lower emissions levels.”10 
 The coding was performed by human coders according to a prespecified set of policy 
belief categories. As such, the qualitative coding was deductive. The results of each coder were 
validated by a research supervisor who maintained the coherence between individual coders. 
While there is no formal measure of intercoder reliability, the set of variables was clearly 
specified without much room for speculation. In rare cases of disagreement between a coder and 
the supervisor, a consensual solution was sought among team members. 
Since we are interested in understanding climate change policymaking in the US 
Congress, this paper presents the results for three of the codes from this analysis that have been 
central themes in the American climate change debate during the period of our study: “legislation 
should regulate carbon dioxide emissions,” “legislation that regulates carbon dioxide emissions 
will not hurt the economy,” and “legislation should establish a market for carbon emissions (cap 
and trade).” Although later discussions have explored the viability of a carbon tax in the United 
States, during the period of our study, cap-and-trade legislation was the only policy instrument 
under consideration. The three codes were selected on the basis of their importance for climate 
policy-making during the period of inquiry. They reflect the major ideological divisions that are 
often cited in the literature on climate change framing and discourse, and as such they are 
substantively interesting for understanding political alliances and the formation of consensus 
regarding climatic change.   
                                                 
10  The full testimony is available at: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings&docid=f:39491.pdf (accessed 28 September 2011). 
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In the appendix to this paper, we present descriptive statistics about the data set including 
overall statement frequencies in Congressional hearings over the period of inquiry (figure A1), 
the distribution of issue stances among different actor types for the different time periods (table 
A1), and the shares of actor types present in the data set in the two time periods under 
consideration (table A2). In addition, the correlations among the issue stances via actors are 
listed in table A3. 
 
Network Analysis Technique 
A “statement” is a text portion where an actor reveals his or her policy beliefs or preferences in 
the text (Leifeld and Haunss, 2012). Each relevant statement of a political actor was coded for 
four variables: the name of the actor, the classification of the policy actor into one of the seven 
types, the issue addressed by the actor (that is, the seven policy belief codes, three of which are 
analyzed below), and a dummy variable indicating either a positive or a negative stance on the 
issue.  
All statements were transformed into an actor-by-issue matrix where each issue occupies 
two distinct columns – one for positive statements where the actor supports the claim and one for 
negative statements where the actor rejects it (i.e., reflecting agreement and disagreement with 
each policy instrument or causal perception). In network terminology, it can be understood as an 
affiliation matrix with two classes of nodes: actors and policy beliefs. To avoid confounding the 
quantity of an actor’s statements and the actor’s qualitative preferences, we dichotomized the 
affiliation matrix in some of the procedures that follow, retaining “0” values where present and 
replacing positive values by the value “1.”  In the multivariate network procedures described 
below, this process guarantees that actors are modeled as showing a high degree of belief 
similarity if they judge many different issues in the same way, not if they agree on a single claim 
repeatedly during Congressional Hearings. 
The rectangular actor-by-issue affiliation matrix was then converted into a square actor-
by-actor matrix (a so-called co-occurrence matrix), where the cell entries reflect the number of 
shared issue stances between the row actor and the column actor (see Leifeld and Haunss, 2012, 
for a methodological description in matrix notation).. Diagonal entries (“loops” in the language 
of social network analysis) were left blank because they merely show the number of policy 
beliefs an actor referred to in total and hence they do not exhibit any useful relational pieces of 
information. A co-occurrence matrix can be interpreted as an undirected and weighted network, 
that is, edges reflect the strength of ideological association between two actors rather than 
merely the presence of an ideological tie, and actor A’s similarity to actor B is the same as actor 
B’s similarity to actor A. The network can be visualized as a graph with actors as vertices and 
the number of shared issue stances as edge weights between these vertices. Clusters of nodes in 
this network represent political coalitions, based on the assumption that coalitions can be 
measured in terms of their similarity of policy beliefs and preferences. The discourse network is 
a good overall indicator of the empirical existence of coalitions, their between-group polarization 
and their within-group congruence in US climate politics, hence we call it a “congruence 
network” (in line with Leifeld and Haunss, 2012).   
Ideologies are composed of rather general, as well as specific, preferences and values. 
When coding the data, we focused on what Sabatier and Weible (2007) call ‘policy core beliefs’ 
because they are the ‘glue that binds coalitions together.’  Policy core beliefs are preferences 
regarding the key dimensions of a specific policy.  A full array of network-analytic methods can 
be used to analyze the congruence network. In our analysis, we employ network density (Scott, 
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2000) and a hierarchical cluster analysis (see below) to describe the network structure, and 
embed these into a qualitative interpretation of the network diagrams and the political process. 
Density is a simple measure of how many ties exist in a network divided by the maximum 
number of ties possible (Scott 2000). It captures how crowded a specific network is in terms of 
its interconnections. A completely connected network has a density of 1, and a network without 
any realized edges has a density score of 0. Density can also be computed for a subgraph instead 
of a whole network, or to assess the number of connections between subgroups of actors. In these 
cases, we call it “within-group” density and “between-group” density, respectively. 
All cluster analyses and estimations of network density are based on two different 
networks: one for the 109th Congress and one for the 110th Congress. All actors and policy 
beliefs are contained within each of these two networks; there are no separate analyses for each 
issue category or for different subsets of actors. However, the different issue categories and actor 
type classifications mentioned above are employed to interpret the network structure in figures 4 
and 5. 
The degree of polarization deserves close attention with sophisticated methods. 
Comparable to several other methods like blockmodeling, clique analysis or projection 
techniques (for an overview, see Scott 2000), an agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis (Jain 
and Dubes, 1988) with Ward's optimization method (Ward 1963) can serve to assess the 
subgroup structure and hence polarization versus consensus in a network. There are two options 
from a methodological point of view: calculating structural similarity of actors based on their tie 
profiles in the congruence network, or calculating the similarity of actors based on similar row 
profiles in the affiliation matrix. We chose the latter option because the construction of the 
congruence network is already a non-isomorphic transformation of the original data.  In other 
words, transforming the data several times before analyzing them would have possibly distorted 
the results and required further justification. An adequate measure of similarity for binary vectors 
like the rows of the affiliation matrix is the Jaccard coefficient (see Jain and Dubes, 1988: 17 for 
details), which we use to compute the distance matrices for the cluster analyses. We compare 
issue coalitions in the 109th and 110th Sessions of the US Congress and derive subgroups for each 
of these time periods.   
The choice of clustering techniques is often arbitrary, and different methods yield 
different results. We therefore opt for methodological triangulation by partitioning all actors into 
one out of two groups based on their tie profiles in the dichotomized affiliation matrix and 
comparing within-block and between-block network densities between the 109th and 110th 
Congress (Scott 2000).  Actors with equal propensities toward the positive and the negative 
group were omitted from the density calculation.  If density is high within a group, its internal 
coherence is high. The lower the density between the two blocks, the more extreme is their 
polarization. Low within- and high between-block densities would indicate the absence of a 
coalition structure. 
 
Findings 
In the pages that follow, we present the results of our analyses of climate change hearings in the 
109th and 110th Sessions of the US Congress.  As has been previously noted, descriptive statistics 
of our data set are available in the paper’s Appendix.  We start by looking at the cluster structure 
of the ideological landscape.  Next we present ideological maps of how political actors are tied 
together by common issue stances and how positions in this network map are related to 
organizational affiliations of participants in these hearings.  After assessing changes in the 
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cliques and polarization between the two Sessions of the US Congress in terms of different actor 
types, we demonstrate how consensus evolves between the 109th and 110th sessions of the 
Congress by visualizing stances on the three issues as different node sizes, shapes and colors in 
the network. Finally, subgraphs containing only Democrats and Republicans reveal that the 
findings extend to members of the Congress and are not limited to interest groups. 
By looking at the descriptive statistics in the appendix, we get a general sense of the 
various perspectives presented in the Congressional hearings on climate change during the 109th 
and 110th Sessions of the US Congress.  It is clear that there was much more support for all of 
these categories in the later session of the Congress and that the position was supported by a 
more diverse set of policy actors in the more recent Congress.  Although this analysis is 
consistent with the type of analysis conducted by the extant research (Burstein and Hirsh, 2007; 
Gormley, 1998; McCright and Dunlap, 2003), the plain numbers do not tell us how consistent 
these positions are across the different categories and what the ideological landscape looks like at 
the aggregate level.  Therefore, the first step in the analysis is to aggregate these different 
categories in a single congruence network for each of the two time periods, as described in the 
methodology section.  Through this process, we are able to assess the overall ideological maps 
for all climate change hearings in the two sessions of Congress. 
 In this analysis, policy actors are separated into clusters based on their similarity across 
the three categories, which are graphically depicted as a dendrogram.  The height of the 
dendrogram represents the (dis)similarity of the clusters. The higher the height at which two 
branches are merged, the less similar they are overall.  Conversely, the lower the agglomeration 
height where two actors or branches are merged, the higher is their similarity.  Placement of 
actors within each group is random.  
 Figure 1 presents the results of this analysis of the three categories together for the 109th 
Congress.  Speakers within the 109th Congress separate out into two distinct “camps” in this 
analysis:  one dominated by Republicans and business groups on the left of the diagram, which 
oppose the categories; and the other dominated by Democrats and environmental groups on the 
right, which support them.  The densities for each group are relatively consistent:  0.79 for those 
taking the oppositional stance and 0.67 for those who take the supportive stance.  These findings 
are consistent with those scholars who find that the issue of climate change has been relatively 
partisan in the US Congress, with Democrats and environmental groups having an oppositional 
perspective to that of Republicans and business interests (McCright and Dunlap, 2003; Park et 
al., 2010; see also Esterling, 2004). 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Turning to the 110th Congress, the bifurcation has disappeared:  the cluster analysis does 
not fall into two specific camps.  Instead, smaller cliques emerge.  For example, there is a small 
group of predominantly Republican Members of Congress who oppose all three categories in the 
center of the diagram.  At the same time, Republican members of Congress also end up in other 
parts of the diagram.  This distribution suggests that climate change is not a partisan issue within 
the 110th Congress. Similarly, environmental groups are uniformly distributed across the 
different clusters. Coalitions are much less clear-cut than before, and the transitions between the 
camps are fluent. Clusters are rather nested within each other, which is an indicator of the lack of 
separation between ideologies.  Figure 2 presents a dendrogram of the three categories together 
for the 110th Congress.  In the 110th Congress, the density of the groups of actors supporting the 
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issue is almost the same as in the 109th Congress: 0.63.  This finding suggests that this cluster is 
rather stable.  The density for the group opposing the issue, however, has dropped 0.24 to 0.55, 
which indicates that it is weaker than the comparable group in the 109th Congress and in relation 
to those who supported this issue in the 110th Congress. 
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 To ensure that the results are not an artifact of the clustering method in this analysis, we 
next analyze the structure of preferences using the aggregated congruence network of all three 
categories.  These results are shown in Figure 3. Gray edges indicate that two actors share one 
single issue stance, and bold, black edges indicate that they share two or more issue stances. In 
line with the previous analyses, there are several interesting findings.  First, the composition of 
the group of supporters of a pro-active climate policy becomes more heterogeneous over time. 
While this group is mainly composed of Democrats in Congress, and environmental non-
governmental organizations in the 109th Congress, many Republicans, business 
associations/firms, and scientists join this group in the 110th Congress.  Second, the number of 
supporters grows substantially over time while the group size of the actors opposing climate 
politics sharply decreases from the 109th to the 110th Congress.  Third, as already suggested by 
the density measure presented above, the coherence of the group that opposes these categories, 
which is depicted on the right side of the diagrams, is declining between the two time periods.  
For those who support the issue and who are depicted by the coalition on the left, the density 
measure is constant.  Fourth, in both time periods, environmental groups shape the center of one 
camp, and business organizations and Republicans in the Congress are at the center of the other 
camp.  Fifth and finally, black edges, which represent higher rates of agreement between actors, 
are prevalent within each of the two camps in the 109th Congress.  In the 110th Congress, 
however, these strong ties are predominant between the two groups. We interpret this difference 
as an erosion of the bipolarity observed in the former time period. This finding is consistent with 
the main finding of the cluster analysis presented above. 
 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Next, we turn to the analysis of the kind of consensus that emerges between the 109th and 
110th sessions of the US Congress. While Figure 3 visualizes actor types as node colors and 
actors’ statement frequencies as the size of the vertices, Figure 4 visualizes the issue stances and 
shows the consensus more clearly. The issue “Legislation that regulates carbon dioxide 
emissions will not hurt the economy” is visualized by using different vertex colors (blue = 
positive statement, red = negative, gray = no statement at all made by this actor). “Legislation 
should regulate carbon dioxide emissions” is visualized by using different vertex shapes 
(rectangle = positive, triangle = negative, circle = NA). “Legislation should establish a market 
for carbon emissions through cap-and-trade” is visualized by using different node sizes (large = 
positive, small = negative, medium = NA). 
In this figure, it is evident that the economic issue can account for the largest share of 
consensus among the actors across both sessions of the Congress. Although the 109th Congress is 
polarized between blue and red nodes, most of the red vertices turn blue in the 110th Congress, 
and both factions move toward the center of the diagram. The negative faction of the carbon 
dioxide legislation issue (triangles) also lose support, and there is a significant increase in cap 
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and trade proponents (large nodes). Most importantly, however, the whole discourse network 
looks far more integrated in the 110th Session, with some red circles amidst the blue faction tying 
the opponents of the economy and carbon dioxide legislation categories closer to the center of 
the plot.  
This integration is possible because there are several actors who – unlike in the previous 
Session – send out mixed signals regarding their policy-related beliefs. In contrast to the 109th 
Congress, there are much fewer actors who use more than one issue in a negative way. Except 
for three small, red triangles and an adjacent small, red circle, there are no such cases in the 110th 
Congress. There are, however, many red triangles in the diagram of the 109th Congress. This 
change shows that the hard-nosed opponents of a climate policy have lost ground by the time of 
the 110th Congress.  It also provides evidence for a decrease in the polarization over time. Actors 
who support all three categories (the large blue squares on the left), in contrast, have become 
much more frequent, and actors evaluating two out of three issues positively are spread around 
this core group and are also much more numerous. 
 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Finally, our analysis distinguishes between policy-makers and organizational attendees of 
Congress meetings. An increasing consensus is only consequential if it extends to legislators, 
who are the actors responsible for passing legislation. Figure 5 presents the same visualization as 
Figure 4 and retains the coordinates of the nodes, but it includes only legislators and omits all 
organizational actors.  As is clear in these figures, the emerging consensus is even stronger 
among policy-makers than among organizations. It is worth noting that one of the reasons for 
their being fewer policy-makers engaged in discussions around this issue in the 109th Congress is 
that lawmakers introduced less than half as many bills related to the issue of climate change in 
the 109th session of the Congress.11 
This result is not particularly surprising given that organizations usually speak for vested 
interests with stronger intrinsic policy-related preferences. The two distinct components from the 
109th Congress are merged into one giant component in the 110th Congress. 
 
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Overall, by using the new technology of the Discourse Network Analyzer to analyze the content 
of Congressional hearings on climate change, we are able to map ideological networks around 
the issue over time.  These findings provide a much clearer picture of changes within US climate 
politics over this four year period. Applying this innovation in social network analysis we go 
beyond the views of current scholars who analyze US climate change politics by looking at the 
policy outcome in terms of the passage (or non-passage) of Congressional legislation (e.g. 
Fisher, 2006; Lisowski 2002, Lutzenhiser, 2001) and the limited studies that assess who speaks 
in Congressional Hearings (e.g. Burstein and Hirsh, 2007; Gormley 1998;  Liu et al., 2009; 
McCright and Dunlap, 2003;  Park et al. 2010).  Instead, this method allows us to assess shifting 
positions within the US Congress. Furthermore, we are able to identify emergent cliques of 
climate policy supporters and opponents over time.   By analyzing the content of discourse 
                                                 
11  For more information, see http://www.c2es.org/federal/congress/110 (accessed 23 April 2012). 
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within the testimonies in Congressional hearings, rather than just the number of hearings and the 
affiliations of witnesses participating in them, we are able to show how interest groups and 
politicians change their preferences over the course of two sessions of the US Congress from 
2005-2008.  These changes provide empirical support to the claim that there was consensus 
forming around the issue of climate change in the US Congress during the 110th session of 
Congress. 
Although our analysis goes beyond that conducted by other scholars who have looked at 
data from Congressional Hearings, there are some consistencies with the conclusions from this 
previous research.  First, like the work by McCright and Dunlap (2003) and Park and his 
colleagues (2010), we do find a high level of partisanship across the participants in 
Congressional Hearings on climate change in the 109th Congress. In the 110th Session of 
Congress, however, the political party of speakers and the affiliations of participating interest 
groups no longer explain support and opposition for this issue.  
The findings from both the 109th and 110th Sessions of the US Congress can also be 
explained, to some degree, by looking at the party that has the majority in Congress. In 
particular, these conclusions are consistent with those of Park and his colleagues, who find that 
hearings on climate change are more likely to take place during a Democrat-controlled 
Congressional session and that such hearings tend to feature testimony from more pro-
environment political actors and mainstream scientists, which is in contrast to Republican-
controlled Congressional sessions where testimonies tend to challenge the science of climate 
change and focus on the negative implications of regulating carbon dioxide  (2010).  Given these 
findings, it is not surprising that there was less polarization around the issue of climate change 
during the 110th Session of Congress, when the Democrats held the majority in the House of 
Representatives and the voting share in the Senate.  
The results of our analysis show how the ideological networks around climate change in 
the US Congress changed over time:  there was a noteworthy increase in supporters of climate 
change legislation and there was a simultaneous decrease in opposition to such legislation.  
Moreover, the diversity of actors supporting climate change legislation in terms of their 
organizational affiliations increased substantially and the support extended to members of the 
Congress themselves.  Even with these changes, however, by the end of the 110th Congress, there 
continued to be opposition to federal climate change legislation.   
Our findings that there was emerging consensus around the issue of climate change in the 
US Congress by the end of the 110th are supported by the fact that the US House of 
Representatives passed a climate change bill for the first time ever during the 111th Congress—
the so-called Waxman-Markey bill (for a full discussion, see Rabe 2011).12  With the Republican 
party taking over the majority of the House of Representatives in the 112th Session of Congress 
in January 2011, there is a clear need to extend this research to understand how climate politics 
and the discourse around these politics has changed more recently.   
Thus, future research must analyze the content of hearings around climate politics in the 
more recent sessions of Congress to map out how ideological networks have continued to 
change. By extending the time period of analysis, we will be able to observe these trends over 
longer periods of time and assess whether changes we have observed between the 109th and 110th 
sessions of the US Congress may be a trend or part of larger random fluctuations.  Until research 
is done on a wider time period, however, these findings must be interpreted with caution as there 
                                                 
12  For more information, see www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2454 (accessed 28 September 
2011).  
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are other potential explanations that must be explored in future research.  In particular, future 
research that includes data from more sessions of the US Congress will help to parse out the 
specific role that the party holding the majority in the Congress plays in shifting ideological 
networks. 
 Our findings also have implications to climate politics more broadly.  Through our 
analysis of the ideological networks of American climate politics during two sessions of 
Congress, we are able to identify clear cliques that cross beyond partisan or other commonly 
understood coalitions.  Looking at the actors who are ideologically positioned as part of different 
clusters in the stacked networks, we can identify opportunities for collaborations that may not 
have previously been recognized.  These findings can also be expanded with analysis of the 
content of Congressional hearings on climate change in more recent sessions of Congress.  Such 
extended research will significantly enhance our understanding of climate politics, as well as 
providing a more robust account of ideological networks within American climate politics. 
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Appendix 
 
In the pages that follow, we present descriptive statistics of the data used in our analysis. 
 
Participation in Congressional Hearings on Climate Change 
We begin by analyzing the types of actors who made statements during the climate change 
hearings in our sample.  In contrast to what one might expect regarding hearings on the issue of 
climate change, most of the statements were not prepared by scientists (about 8% in the 109th and 
11% in the 110thCongress).  The majority of the speakers in both sessions of the Congress came 
from different branches of the US government.   Although the hearings in both sessions of the 
Congress were dominated by government actors, there are a number of differences between these 
two sessions that are worth noting.  First, there are striking differences between the government 
actors participating in the climate change hearings in these different sessions of the Congress.  
Even though the rules of the US Congress stipulate that the minority party is given the 
opportunity to call witnesses at Congressional hearings,13  participation in these hearings was 
very different in the two sessions of Congress.  In the 109th Session of Congress, which had a 
Republican majority, almost a quarter of the statements (24%) were provided by Republican 
members of the Congress.  During the 110th Session of the Congress, which had a Democratic 
majority, in contrast, only five percent of people making statements were Republican members 
of the Congress. Although the level of Republican participation changed significantly during 
these two Congressional Sessions, Democratic participation remained relatively stable (24% and 
20% respectively).  At the same time, participation by the Bush Administration increased 
significantly between the 109th and 110th Sessions (10% and 22% respectively). Table 1 presents 
these results.  There are also noteworthy differences among non-governmental actors.  
Participation by representatives of businesses and business or trade associations decreased 
between the 109th and 110th sessions of Congress (20% to 14%).  However, environmental group 
participation went up between these two sessions of the US Congress (about 9% to almost 15% 
respectively).   
TABLE A1 ABOUT HERE 
 
How are actor types related to different concepts in the 109th and in the 110th Congress? 
Although these results show that there are interesting patterns of participation during these two 
sessions of the US Congress, they do not tell us anything about the content of the Hearings.  
Accordingly, we now look at the distribution of issue stances among actor types in the 109th and 
110th Congress for each of the three categories. Table A2 presents the number of statements per 
actor group and by time period and stance for each of the categories included in this analysis. 
TABLE A2 ABOUT HERE 
Legislation should regulate carbon dioxide emissions. There is a high level of 
polarization around the question of whether legislation should regulate carbon dioxide in both 
sessions of the Congress. In the 109th Congress, twenty-six policy actors spoke in support of the 
category and twelve spoke against it.  There was only one policy actor who presented a moderate 
position, speaking on both sides of this issue—both for and against emissions legislation that 
                                                 
13 For a full discussion of these rules see http://lieberman.senate.gov/assets/pdf/crs/senatehearings.pdf for the 
Sentate and http://www.house.gov/house/Tying_it_all.shtml for the House of Representatives.  (accessed 28 
September 2011). 
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includes the regulation of carbon dioxide.  In this session of Congress, the policy actors against 
this category were all Republicans, representatives of the Bush Administration, and 
representatives of businesses or trade associations.  Those in support of this category, in contrast, 
were mostly Democrats in the Congress and environmental groups.  
In the 110th Congress, there were far fewer actors speaking against the category and many 
more actors supporting it: only eight spoke against this category and forty policy actors spoke in 
support of it.  Actors against this issue continued to come from the same social groups.  There 
was one environmental group—the Natural Resources Stewardship Project, which is a Canadian 
non-profit organization that is known to include a number of leading climate change skeptics.14 
At the same time, there were also businesses and Republicans in Congress who supported 
this position.   Although this issue continued to be polarized in the 110th Congress, there was less 
opposition and more support for legislation to regulate carbon dioxide by a broader range of 
actors. 
Legislation that regulates carbon dioxide emissions will not hurt the economy. 
Statements during Congressional hearings on climate change frequently discussed the economic 
implications of regulating carbon dioxide.  In the 109th Congress, there was a very high level of 
polarization around this issue.  In fact, the debate was relatively balanced and there were almost 
an equal number of speakers for and against this category (22 versus 23 accordingly).  Here 
again, those actors against the issue were predominantly Republicans in the Congress and 
businesses.  Also like the first category, most of those actors who supported this statement were 
Democrats in the Congress and environmental groups. However, business and trade associations 
also supported this category. 
In the 110th Congress, there was much less polarization:  three different policy actors 
presented a moderate position, speaking on both sides of this category.   Like the first category, 
support for the issue grew in this Congress and thirty-eight actors spoke in support of the issue 
while thirteen spoke against it in the later session.  The increase in support also resulted in a 
broader diversity of actors supporting this category, including scientists. 
Legislation should establish a market for carbon emissions through cap-and-trade.  This 
subject was not a main topic of discussion during Congressional hearings in the 109th Congress.  
In this session, only twenty-one people spoke about it in their statements:  thirteen policy actors 
spoke in support of this category and eight spoke against it.  Supporters were mainly from 
environmental groups.  Like the previous two categories, those actors against the issue were 
mostly Republicans in the Congress and businesses.   
In the 110th Congress, there was a lot more discussion about this issue.  Thirty-seven 
actors spoke in support of it and eleven spoke against it.  Supporters in this Congress included 
Democrats and Republicans in the Congress, along with environmental groups and business 
groups.  Opposition was made up almost entirely of Republicans in the Congress. It is worth 
noting that there was one environmental group that spoke in opposition to the establishment of a 
cap-and-trade system in the United States:  the American Council for an Energy- Efficient 
Economy. 
FIGURE A1 ABOUT HERE 
 
                                                 
14  For more information, see www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Natural_Resources_Stewardship_Project 
(accessed 28 September 2011). 
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Figure A1 shows a graphical representation of the data from table A2. The number of 
positive statements is increased between the 109th and 110th Sessions of Congress in all three 
cases, while the number of negative statements is generally decreased, with the exception of the 
cap-and-trade issue. Most importantly, however, the diagrams demonstrate that this pattern 
holds, and is even more pronounced, for both Democrats and Republicans in the US Congress. 
The increase of negative cap-and-trade statements can be largely attributed to Republicans, but 
their marginal increase in positive cap-and-trade statements even exceeds their marginal increase 
in negative statements of this kind. 
 
Correlation between issues 
Table A3 reports correlations between issue stances based on the raw number of statements of a 
certain kind per actor. It is noteworthy that the correlation between different issues is fairly high, 
while the correlation between positive and negative pairs of issue stances is low in all cases, as 
expected. Interestingly, the cap-and-trade issue is correlated with the other issues to a lesser 
extent, which is also reflected by the network analysis. 
 
TABLE A3 ABOUT HERE 
 
It is worth noting that the methods employed in this article do not require orthogonality 
of issues. The network analysis techniques presented in the article are rather a tool to analyze the 
dimensionality of the ideological space without being confined to two dimensions. The 
correlations are an interesting feature of the data, rather than an obstacle to the analysis. 
 
Distribution of statements across time 
Figure A2 shows the number of statements per month for all three issues. While most months are 
populated by a moderate number of statements, an extraordinarily high number of statements 
were made at the beginning of each of the two sessions of the US Congress that are included in 
this analysis. 
 
FIGURE A2 ABOUT HERE 
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Figure 1: Dendrogram of 109th Congress 
 
Notes: The left side of the diagram represents opposition and position within the clusters cannot be meaningfully interpreted in the dendrogram.   
Color code: Blue indicates Democrats in Congress, Green indicates environmental groups, Pink indicates representatives from the 
executive branch of the government, Purple indicates businesses and business and trade organizations, Red indicates Republicans 
in Congress, Yellow indicates scientists, and Grey indicates policy actors that fall into the “other” category.   
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Figure 2: Dendrogram of 110th Congress 
 
 
Notes: The left side of the diagram represents opposition and position within the clusters cannot be meaningfully interpreted in the dendrogram.   
Color code: Blue indicates Democrats in Congress, Green indicates environmental groups, Pink indicates representatives from the 
executive branch of the government, Purple indicates businesses and business and trade organizations, Red indicates Republicans 
in Congress, Yellow indicates scientists, and Grey indicates policy actors that fall into the “other” category.   
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Figure 3:  Aggregated congruence network – visualization of actor types 
 
Notes: Aggregate network visualizations for the 109th (upper diagram) and 110th Congress (lower 
diagram). The right side of the diagrams represents opposition; node size is a function of 
statement frequency; and spatial proximity cannot be meaningfully interpreted in network 
diagrams. 
Key: Blue indicates Democrats in Congress, Green indicates environmental groups, Pink 
indicates representatives from the executive branch of the government, Purple indicates 
businesses and business and trade organizations, Red indicates Republicans in Congress, Yellow 
indicates scientists, and Gray indicates policy actors that fall into the “other” category. Dark and 
bold edges indicate agreement on more than one issue stance.  
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Figure 4:  Aggregated congruence network – visualization of issue stances 
 
Notes: Aggregate network visualizations for the 109th (upper diagram) and 110th Congress (lower 
diagram). The right side of the diagrams represents opposition. Spatial proximity cannot be 
meaningfully interpreted in network diagrams. 
Key: Node color indicates different stances in the statement category “Legislation that regulates 
carbon dioxide emissions will not hurt the economy” (blue = yes; red = no; gray = no statement 
available). Node shape indicates different stances in the category “Legislation should regulate 
carbon dioxide emissions” (rectangle = yes; triangle = no; circle = no statement available). Node 
size indicates different stances in the category “Legislation should establish a market for carbon 
emissions (cap and trade)” (large = yes; small = no; medium = no statement available). Dark and 
bold edges indicate agreement on more than one issue stance.
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Figure 5:  Visualization of issue stances – only Democrats and Republicans 
 
Notes: Aggregate network visualizations for the 109th (upper diagram) and 110th Congress (lower 
diagram), only displaying Democrats and Republicans. Node coordinates from figure 5 have been 
retained. The right side of the diagrams represents opposition. Spatial proximity cannot be 
meaningfully interpreted in network diagrams. 
Key: Node color indicates different stances in the statement category “Legislation that regulates 
carbon dioxide emissions will not hurt the economy” (blue = yes; red = no; gray = no statement 
available). Node shape indicates different stances in the category “Legislation should regulate 
carbon dioxide emissions” (rectangle = yes; triangle = no; circle = no statement available). Node 
size indicates different stances in the category “Legislation should establish a market for carbon 
emissions (cap and trade)” (large = yes; small = no; medium = no statement available). Dark and 
bold edges indicate agreement on more than one issue stance.  
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Figure A1:  Line charts  
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Figure A2: Statement Frequencies over Time 
 
 
Key: green = “legislation should regulate carbon dioxide emissions;” red = “legislation that 
regulates carbon dioxide emissions will not hurt the economy;” and blue = and “legislation 
should establish a market for carbon emissions (cap and trade).” 
.
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Table A1. Organizational Affiliations of Witnesses at Congressional Hearings on Climate 
Change (2005-2008) 
 
109th Congress  110th Congress  
Business or Business 
Association/Trade Group 85 (20.6%) 54 (13.9%) 
Democrat in Congress 100 (24.3%) 79 (20.2%) 
Environmental Group 36 (8.7%) 58 (14.8%) 
Republican in Congress 99 (24%) 19 (4.9%) 
Scientist 34 (8.3%) 42 (10.7%) 
US Executive Branch 41 (10%) 87 (22.3%) 
Other 17 (4.1%) 51 (13%) 
Total  412 391 
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Table A2. Number of statements per actor group and by time period and stance. 
 
“Legislation that regulates carbon dioxide emissions will not hurt the economy.” 
 
109th Congress 110th Congress 
 
yes no yes no 
Democrats 5 (8) 1 (2) 14 (17) 0 (0) 
Republicans 0 (0) 7 (19) 6 (8) 5 (12) 
Government 2 (2) 2 (3) 2 (2) 1 (2) 
Business 5 (5) 10 (25) 1 (1) 4 (19) 
Environmental NGOs 6 (7) 0 (0) 5 (9) 0 (0) 
Science 1 (2) 1 (1) 4 (5) 0 (0) 
Other 3 (5) 2 (2) 6 (8) 3 (3) 
Total 22 (29) 23 (52) 38 (50) 13 (36) 
 
“Legislation should regulate carbon dioxide emissions.” 
 
109th Congress 110th Congress 
 
yes no yes no 
Democrats 4 (12) 0 (0) 9 (11) 0 (0) 
Republicans 0 (0) 5 (12) 7 (10) 5 (6) 
Government 2 (2) 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 
Business 6 (8) 5 (16) 5 (6) 1 (3) 
Environmental NGOs 8 (15) 0 (0) 9 (19) 1 (1) 
Science 2 (2) 0 (0) 5 (6) 0 (0) 
Other 4 (6) 1 (2) 4 (5) 0 (0) 
Total 26 (45) 12 (31) 40 (58) 8 (11) 
 
“Legislation should establish a market for carbon emissions (cap and trade).” 
 
109th Congress 110th Congress 
 
yes no yes no 
Democrats 0 (0) 0 (0) 13 (20) 0 (0) 
Republicans 0 (0) 2 (3) 6 (10) 5 (11) 
Government 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 1 (1) 
Business 4 (4) 4 (5) 2 (2) 2 (4) 
Environmental NGOs 8 (8) 1 (1) 10 (21) 2 (4) 
Science 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 0 (0) 
Other 1 (1) 1 (1) 4 (6) 1 (1) 
Total 13 (13) 8 (10) 37 (61) 11 (21) 
 
Notes: Numbers in brackets indicate the raw number of statements, including instances where a 
speaker made the statement in a testimony more than once.  The numbers outside the brackets 
reflect the number of different actors making this statement in the given time period. 
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Table A3. Correlations between issue stances 
 
 
YES NO 
 
 
Economy CO2 
Cap & 
Trade Economy CO2 
Cap & 
Trade 
Y
ES
 Economy 1.00 
     CO2 0.59 1.00 
    Cap & Trade 0.48 0.44 1.00 
   
N
O
 Economy -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 1.00 
  CO2 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 0.72 1.00 
 Cap & Trade 0.23 0.19 0.19 0.62 0.33 1.00 
 
